How to do Empire Right? by Ahmed Asif, Manan
Elizabeth Thompson Butler was one of the most celebrat-ed painters of military life and scenes in the late 19th century imperial Britain. She first gar-nered wide fame for her painting 
Roll Call (1874), about the aftermath of the cha-
otic Crimean War. It depicts a sad and dishev-
eled group of soldiers awaiting the morning roll 
call. It was a starkly un-romantic view of the 
troops, which sparked a wide-ranging debate 
on British military practices. Its significance as 
a cultural artifact was confirmed when Queen 
Victoria purchased the painting for her own col-
lection. But what sealed Butler’s reputation was 
The Remnants of an Army, which was unveiled in 
1879. This was her portrait of Dr William Brydon, 
purportedly the last survivor of the 1842 British 
retreat from Kabul in the aftermath of the first 
Anglo-Afghan War. Against a distant and barren 
landscape, the painting foregrounded a hunched 
figure atop a tired, almost dying, horse, while a 
rescue party was seen charging from a fort. The 
painting was unveiled at a time when the Em-
pire was engaged in the second Anglo-Afghan 
War and the mood was rather boisterous.
Butler framed the war through both text and 
image—the title “Remnants of an Army” en-
dowed a sense of tragedy to the lone figure, and 
the landscape against which he was pictured 
was an unforgiving, endless one. Butler’s deci-
sion to portray Brydon as the only surviving 
member of an imperial army seems to have been 
a conscious one, and deserves our attention. Ap-
pearing at a time when the second Anglo-Af-
ghan War (1878-80) was in full swing, Butler’s 
painting sounded a cautionary note on the impe-
rial project in Afghanistan. 
It was well known by 1878, though legends 
abounded to the contrary, that Dr Brydon was 
not the sole survivor of the 1842 retreat. Many 
hundreds of the nearly 17,000 troops and civil-
ians who evacuated Kabul—only 700 or so were 
British nationals—had survived. Hundreds of 
the indigenous infantry (sepoys) were captured 
and sold into slavery by Afghan troops. A num-
ber of British officers and their retinues were 
taken as hostages by the warring princeling Ak-
bar Khan, who led the main force against the 
British. The memoirs of the British survivors 
and some of the military testimonies of the se-
poys were subsequently published and debated, 
and were commonly known truths of imperial 
London. Hence Butler’s decision to project Bry-
don as a sole survivor was less documentation 
of fact and more a comment on the high price 
that this frontier region could extract from the 
Empire. Butler seemed to want to ensure that 
the general euphoria about imperial aims in Af-
ghanistan was tempered by a recognition of past 
setbacks. Her painting of Dr Brydon, who had 
died in 1873, was not a condemnation of war, but 
rather a warning, a plea to learn from mistakes. 
Butler’s depiction of the first Anglo-Afghan 
war went on to become the basis of a long-en-
during myth on the futility of imperial interven-
tion in Afghanistan, an image of the hubris of co-
lonial imagination in the high steppes of Central 
Asia, providing inspiration for those who want-
ed to do empire ‘right’. The image, which started 
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out as a warning, transitioned over the years 
into a convenient hook for all manners of florid 
fantasies of power and imperial rule—adorning 
book covers and plates in tome after tome.
The impetus to keep trying to get the proj-
ect of Empire right in Afghanistan also comes 
from another iconic myth generated by impe-
rial sources—a myth with just as tangential a 
relation to history as the one created by Butler’s 
The Remnants of an Army. This was the ‘Great 
Game’. There are only incidental references to 
this phrase in political tracts prior to the mid-
19th century, when it could refer to any number 
of conflicts—American, Ottoman, French—and 
any number of theatres—India, Europe, America. 
The term became associated with British-Rus-
sian rivalry in the latter half of the 19th century, 
thanks largely to the historian John W Kaye, 
who popularised it in his Lives of Indian Officers 
(1867). It was next invoked by Rudyard Kipling in 
Kim (1901), in which the idea of the Great Game 
acquired a cloak-and-dagger quality. 
But it was only after the Second World War 
that ‘Great Game’ explicitly became, in Cold 
War literature, the label for a grand and roman-
tic theatre of covert war. It was then that the 
popular press cemented a connection between 
the postwar era and the British-Russian rivalry 
of an earlier century. The motif grew to include 
the intrigues between the spies of the CIA and 
the KGB. As the political domain of the Cold 
War shifted east—towards Iran and then Af-
ghanistan—the lessons of the Great Game were 
constantly invoked and arguments made to play 
the game according to a gentleman’s code. It was 
a cruel irony that while the various states were 
enacting bloody and divisive policies in Afghan-
istan, the discourse of the intelligentsia trum-
peted the metaphor of a game, with all its impli-
cations of rules, procedures and equal partners 
engaged in daring and fun activities. This meta-
phor was used to provide the necessary ring of 
grandeur to a clearly imperial project resulting 
in killing fields and the massive dislocation of 
native populations.
Now, in the near-aftermath of the fourth Anglo-Afghan War, William Dal-rymple takes the frame of Last Remnants 
of an Army and the intrigue of the Great Game 
and fills in all that Butler had elided and Kipling 
implied. Dalrymple’s Return of a King: The Bat-
tle for Afghanistan (1839-42) is the 3-D, IMAX, 
48-frames-per-second Hollywood version—fea-
turing Kabul, Jalalabad, Qandahar, Peshawar, 
Lahore, Ludhiana, London and Moscow. Brydon 
is joined by a wide cast of characters, native and 
colonial, elite and subaltern, male and female: 
there is Shah Shuja (the titular King), whom the 
British wish to place on the throne in Kabul; Al-
exander Burnes, the British political agent who 
knows the land, its languages and its women 
intimately; Dost Muhammad Khan, the upstart 
tribal ruler occupying the throne in Kabul and seen 
















Elizabeth Thompson Butler’s Remnants of an Army depicted the rout of the British in 1842, following the first Anglo-Afghan war.
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to be scheming with the Russians; British military 
men and their wives exemplified by Robert and 
Florentia Sale; the young warrior Akbar Khan who 
is leading the war against the British; his native 
ally, the Sikh ruler of Punjab and Peshawer, Raja 
Ranjit Singh; and the native informant, the munshi 
Mohan Lal Kashmiri, among others. 
The story is straightforward. Shah Shuja has 
lost his throne in Kabul and is in exile in Punjab. 
The British suspect that the current occupant, 
Dost Muhammad, may align himself with the 
Russians and provide a base for them to attack 
India. Hence, the British launch a campaign to 
help Shah Shuja win back Kabul. They manage 
this successfully and install the King, but very 
soon after, Akbar Khan, Dost Muhammad’s son, 
retaliates and takes back Kabul, expels or cap-
tures the British (the rout seen in Butler’s paint-
ing of Brydon); Shah Shuja is killed in the after-
math. The British launch a second expedition 
to avenge the defeat and in doing so decimate 
a large part of the Afghan population and vast 
tracts of the city. 
The book is an action spectacular with be-
headings, boilings, de-boning and skewering 
aplenty. The characters are larger than life—
often written as prophetic and tragic voices of 
doom. The current war in Afghanistan looms 
over each page and in footnotes, where Dal-
rymple ties a geographic or genealogic thread 
between the text and the subtext. In keeping 
with the spirit of Butler’s painting, this is still an 
effort to do empire ‘right’: “It is still not too late 
to learn some lessons from the mistakes of the 
British in 1842”. 
Dalrymple, the most famous living British mi-
grant to India, is now firmly established as one of 
its most visible public intellectuals. His previous 
books White Mughals (2002) and The Last Mu-
ghal (2006) parlayed a similarly attractive mix-
ture of biography and cultural history to make 
tangible present-day contestations. In his opin-
ion and review pieces in the Indian, US and UK 
press, his engagement with the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is often critical though prescriptive. 
He champions the literary and musical talents of 
South Asia both at home (as co-organiser of the 
annual Jaipur Literature Festival, for example), 
and abroad (as a co-curator for museum exhibi-
tions and concerts). He is almost unrivalled in 
the English-speaking world as a historical and 
cultural commentator on South Asia. As such, 
he is able to marshal vast resources for his work 
from key sectors of the military, the state, and 
the academy. A small illustration: senior cura-
tors and researchers (Sue Stronge of Victoria 
and Albert Museum, John Falconer of British 
Library); prominent historians (Saul David, John 
Keay, Chris Bayly, Ayesha Jalal, Nile Green, BN 
Goswamy); members of the Indian, British, Af-
ghan and American state apparatuses (Amrul-
lah Saleh, Chief of Security for President Karzai; 
Ashraf Ghani, ex-Finance Minister of Afghani-
stan; Sir Sherard Cowper Coles, British Foreign 
Secretary; Rory Stewart, British Member of Par-
liament; Brigadier General Simon Levey, British 
Commander; Jayant Prasad, former Indian Am-
bassador to Afghanistan; Charles Allen, formerly 
a prominent functionary of both the US State De-
partment and the Central Intelligence Agency); 
and cultural and research institutions (British 
Council, UNESCO, French Archeological Mis-
sion, Aga Khan Foundation, Punjab Archives La-
hore, National Archives India) are among those 
explicitly thanked in the acknowledgments. Add 
to this the work of Bruce Wannell, Aliyah Naqvi, 
Tommy Wide and Robert McChesney, who trans-
lated all of the Persian or Urdu sources employed 
by Dalrymple, and you see why I called this a 
“Hollywood version”—this is truly a grand col-
laborative effort, linking the highest echelons of 
academic, military, political and cultural spheres. 
In Return of a King, Dalrymple seeks to offer 
a corrective to the imperial mission in Afghani-
stan while highlighting the work of Afghan his-
torians and accounts in Dari or Persian from 
the 1840s so as to tell a history of the country 
in the voices of its own historians. He argues 
that the first Anglo-Afghan war resonates with 
the events post October 2001, especially in the 
figure of Hamid Karzai and the tribal politics of 
post-Taliban Afghanistan. Dalrymple makes an 
attempt to connect the claims of imminent Rus-
sian intervention in Afghanistan, which spurred 
the first Anglo-Afghan war, to the spurious 
evidence regarding the presence of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, which launched the Iraq War 


























A British military camp in Afghanistan, 1879.
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in 2002, but this is not a strong argument and he 
does not make it strongly either. He is more suc-
cessful in highlighting the hubris in the British 
(and by corollary American) officials, as well as 
the short-sightedness of policy in both the 19th 
century scenario and the 21st century one. Just 
as the attempt to caution the imperial capital 
echoes Butler’s Remnants of an Army, making 
space for the native voice as a corrective to the 
current project in Afghanistan recalls the work 
of Henry Miers Elliot, whose eight volumes of 
History of India as told by its own Historians ap-
peared between 1866 and 1877.
The ten chapters of Return roughly cover the 
period from the first decade of the 19th century 
to 1842. In the opening chapters, Dalrymple fo-
cuses on the person of Shah Shuja, the claimant 
to the throne of Afghanistan, his succession, and 
the machinations between the East India Com-
pany and the Sikh empire in Punjab in the early 
decades of the 19th century. The Company de-
feated the Marathas as well as captured Delhi 
in 1801-3 and immediately looked to the north-
west, where Ranjit Singh’s Punjab empire had 
emerged in 1801. The Great Game is the dramat-
ic framework within which Dalrymple places 
this history and his characters—chief among 
them is Alexander Burnes, the British political 
agent who emerges as the other protagonist of 
the book. Burnes is the learned man of letters 
and lothario who knows much, says little and 
dies heroically. Through Burnes’s own corre-
spondence and the accounts of his associates, 
Dalrymple creates the figure of the tragic hero 
who saw the writing on the wall but was unable 
to change the short-sighted men at the helm. 
In these early chapters, Dalrymple’s tone is a 
tad too portentous, always invoking the dark ho-
rizon of the future. One can almost hear the cre-
scendo of a Wagnerian score when Burnes meets 
his counterpart, the Russian officer Ivan Vitkev-
itch at Dost Mohammad Khan’s court in Kabul: 
“The dinner between the two great rivals—the 
first such meeting in the history of the Great 
Game—took place on Christmas Day 1837”. Ex-
cept, as Dalrymple documents, Vitkevitch’s ef-
forts at communicating with Kabul amounted to 
not much more than a passing curiosity for the 
Russians, who were rather unconcerned with 
Afghanistan—and Burnes himself did not feel he 
was in a rivalry with the Russian. The invocation 
of the Great Game may provide Dalrymple with 
the necessary tension and forward momentum 
for a political history but such a reading cannot 
be sustained by historical evidence.
The second half of Return of a King is particu-
larly riveting, and tightly written. Dalrymple at-
tempts, as much as possible, to be generous to the 
sources he is citing—incorporating large chunks 
of primary text. He describes how the governance 
of Afghanistan begins to falter under the twinned 
yet distinct ideals of Shah Shuja and the Compa-
ny—the various tribal histories and their inimical 
politics come to the forefront. The Company offi-
cials, cracking under the strain of heavy financial 
burden, begin to take desperate measures and 
step by step aggravate allies and enemies alike. 
As distrust grows, Akbar Khan begins to mar-
shal support by declaring jihad on the British and 
breaking off alliances with Shah Shuja. Eventu-
ally, Qandahar and Kabul are both in flames and 
the British are uprooted violently by Akbar Khan 
and his new allies. Shah Shuja is slain. This is tre-
mendous writing. Dalrymple manages to keep 
the multivocal texts in sync with his own voice, 
and keeps the narrative time ticking.
To Dalrymple’s credit, though he had invoked 
the Great Game in the earlier chapters, this is 
not a narrative solely about men engaged in 
charged, clandestine pursuits, with nary a word 
about the human cost of their actions. Dalrym-
ple does not hide the violence of the Game, and 
he does not make it cavalier. His two finest chap-
ters turn on the disparate accounts of violence 
in various British and Afghan sources about 
the actions in Qandahar and in Kabul starting 
in 1841. In the chapter ‘All Order is at End’, Dal-
rymple traces the death of Alexander Burnes in 
November 1841, at the hands of a mob, incensed 
or provoked into action after an accusation that 
Burnes had dishonoured an Afghan woman. In 
‘A War for No Wise Purpose’, he documents the 
ravaging of Afghanistan by General Pollock’s 


































The ‘upstart’ tribal ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad Khan.
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retributive army. In both chapters, Dalrymple 
expertly switches between colonial and local ac-
counts, keeping the perspective on the partici-
pants by reproducing large chunks of their tes-
timony in the account and letting the texture of 
these witness accounts speak for itself. 
Despite his successfully presenting a nuanced account of the fallouts of the 19th century imperial mission in Afghan-
istan, Dalrymple’s framework—a framework that 
ties 2012 to 1842—requires him to ignore a huge 
range of historical events that are much more 
relevant than the Great Game in understanding 
the Anglo-Afghan conflict. For instance, in 1830 
Shah Ismail and Syed Ahmed, two scions of the 
religious elite in Delhi who set out to establish 
a new kingdom of Allah in the north and who 
mobilised many Pathan tribes, declared a jihad 
against the Sikh kingdom, the first time this was 
used as a political tool. This is an important ideo-
logical link to the history Dalrymple is present-
ing, necessary in understanding how Dost Mo-
hammad and Akbar Khan, too, invoked jihad as a 
military tool against Shah Shuja and the British. 
Jihad as a political strategy in north India con-
tinued to play a role in the century that followed.
Similarly, Dalrymple leaves out the crucial 
history of the opium trade. This trade was the 
impetus for the Company’s efforts to control 
the Indus River channel—which put it in direct 
conflict with two princely states: Punjab and 
Sindh. In Punjab, Ranjit Singh held Lahore since 
1799 and had designs on the northwest and the 
south, and the British kept a very wary eye on 
him. Dalrymple does a great job of portraying 
the personality of Ranjit Singh and his role in 
the early stages of the Anglo-Afghan conflict (he 
dies in 1839) but does not link him to the Com-
pany’s economic policies. Similarly, the mouth 
of the Indus river into the Arabian Gulf, through 
which opium was shipped, was governed by the 
Emirs of Sindh, whom the Company went on to 
depose in 1843. The Company, more than a play-
er of geo-politics, was a public stock company 
with an eye on the crucial bottom line. Overall 
in the book, Dalrymple does not differentiate 
between British Royal/Parliamentarian politics 
and Company politics. 
Further, Dalrymple stops his story in 1842, 
but his linking of 1842 to 2012 excludes the post-
1857 Raj from his frame. The turbulence of 1857 
(which Dalrymple has covered in previous books 
but does not discuss here) merits inclusion pre-
cisely because it gives birth to the colonial prac-
tices of ethnography as a basis for governing the 
tribes of the Northwest frontier. The British, 
recognising that honour was a necessary and 
strategic aspect of Pathan life, commissioned 
ethnographies of Paktunwalli (the Pathan way 
of life) to prove it, thus advancing a seemingly 
scientific basis for the categories of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ tribal leaders. 
The list could go on, but the substantial point 
is simply this: given the complex history of the 
region, there is no simple equation possible be-
tween those who hold power in present day Af-
ghanistan and those who were attempting to 
control it in 1842. If the aim of Dalrymple’s book 
is to explicate a slice of Afghanistan’s 19th cen-
tury past on its own terms, then this criticism 
is invalid. However, as his epilogue to the last 
chapter makes clear, he is pointedly linking this 
slice of history to Afghanistan’s immediate past 
and current quandary.
The decade-long effort in Afghanistan to create 
a civil body, under a figurehead, Hamid Karzai, is 
nearing its end. Since 2008, we have seen surges, 
displacements, assassinations via drones, securi-
ty-clearance murders, bombs, and a renewed Tal-
iban presence across the Pashtun region. To read 
Dalrymple’s Return of a King in this supremely 
dispiriting world is to surrender willingly to a 
narrative out of sync with the multiple histories 
at play in the region. There is no romance in Af-
ghanistan (as Dalrymple notes repeatedly con-
cerning the dangers he faces while doing research 
there) and his tendency to endow the figures of 
Shah Shuja and Alexander Burnes with romance 
is jarring and troubling. Dalrymple’s focus on this 
particular segment of history, and his placing it 
within the framework of the Great Game, also 
ends up effacing the arguably more pertinent his-
tories of the Cold War and Russian and Pakistani 
incursions into Afghanistan. Taking into account 
this immediate history of violence, however, 
would only have been possible were Dalrymple 
engaged in a more thoroughgoing critique of em-
pire and not one that is at the service of bettering 
Western-driven governance in Afghanistan and 
the pacification of Afghan tribes. 
Dalrymple ends his book with another famil-
iar image: an American soldier asks an Afghan 
elder, why do you hate us? Obliquely, Dalrymple 
offers Return of a King as an answer to that ques-
tion. It just happens to be the wrong question to 
ask in 2012.   s
// An American soldier asks an Afghan elder, 
why do you hate us? Obliquely, Dalrymple 
offers Return of a King as an answer to that 
question. It just happens to be the wrong 
question to ask in 2012. //
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